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Foreword | Digital technologies are 
often considered effective methods of 
deterring or preventing crime. New 
forms of surveillance have particular 
appeal when attempting to reduce 
violence in the night-time economy, 
given ongoing concerns over perceived 
increases in the frequency and severity 
of reported assaults. This study examines 
the rationales for adopting compulsory 
patron ID scanning as a key method of 
reducing violence in and around licensed 
venues in the Victorian regional city of 
Geelong. Using a mixed methods 
approach, this paper challenges the 
popular perception that ID scanning has 
helped to reduce violence Geelong’s 
night-time economy. Further, the 
research identifies several limits in the 
administration of this technology that 
potentially undermine patron safety in 
the night-time economy. The authors 
conclude by proposing a series of reforms 
to address current regulatory gaps 
associated with ID scanning and related 
surveillance and identity authentication 
technologies to prevent crime.
Adam Tomison 
Director
ID scanners in the night-time 
economy: Social sorting or 
social order?
Darren Palmer, Ian Warren and Peter Miller
In recent years, mandatory digital identification scanning has emerged as a precondition 
of entry into many licensed venues throughout Australia. Given ongoing social concerns 
about violence in Australia’s night-time economies, this untested policy initiative uses 
increased patron surveillance to enhance interpersonal security. Considered a supplement 
to the mandatory installation of closed circuit television (CCTV) systems, ID scanning 
promises to enhance social order by deterring wrongful behaviour and enabling the 
rapid identification of both perpetrators and victims of violence. This paper documents 
the findings of a detailed study, which examined the implementation of mandatory 
patron ID scanning in the Victorian regional city of Geelong, and assessed its perceived 
effectiveness in reducing violence since being first introduced in 2007 [1]. Although venue 
licensees and patrons view this technology extremely favourably, in-depth interviews with 
several key stakeholders revealed considerable uncertainty about appropriate security 
training, data management and information privacy arrangements. In addition, police and 
emergency department statistics demonstrate little connection between the coordinated 
introduction of ID scanners and reduced levels of alcohol-related assault in the Geelong 
night-time economy.
Violence in the night-time economy
The considerable growth of night-time economies in urban centres throughout the United 
Kingdom, North America and Australia has generated widespread concern over perceived 
increases in the rates of interpersonal violence. Since the mid-1980s, most Australian states 
have adopted liberalised approaches to liquor licensing with a view to enriching commercial, 
entertainment and late-night trading activity. Such deregulation has enabled more venues 
with increased patron capacity to trade for longer periods (Zajdow 2011), as well as the 
clustering of nightclubs in urban entertainment precincts.
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Extensive research indicates that much 
interpersonal violence in night-time 
economies in Australia and the United 
Kingdom (Hadfield 2006; Hadfield, Lister & 
Traynor 2009; Winlow & Hall 2006) is directly 
linked to the lax administration of liquor 
licensing controls (Graham & Homel 2008; 
Homel et al. 1997). Questionable policing 
and security arrangements (Tomsen 2005), 
poor environmental amenity, inadequate 
entertainment and poor transportation 
facilities for nightclub patrons are also 
consistently associated with excessive 
alcohol supply and consumption, which 
increases the potential for interpersonal 
violence (Graham & Homel 2008).
Between 1 July 2002 and 30 June 2012, 
Victoria Police statistics documented a 
small yet consistent increase in reported 
assaults and related offences (Victoria 
Police 2012a). Of the 42,076 assaults 
reported in 2011–12, only 3.4 percent 
occurred inside licensed venues (Victoria 
Police 2012b). A further 25 percent were 
classified as ‘street related incidents’ 
(Victoria Police 2010: 18). However, at 
present, publicly available data in Victoria 
do not identify the time, precise location or 
proportion of incidents related to alcohol 
consumption in the vicinity of individual 
venues or in nightclub precincts. These 
limits make it difficult to determine overall 
trends in the frequency and severity of 
violent assaults in the night-time economy, 
which complicates the evaluation of any 
crime prevention initiatives.
Extensive media coverage and public outrage 
towards extreme cases of violence that lead 
to serious injury or death, frequently provide 
the impetus for introducing new and untested 
methods of enhancing venue security. 
One example involves the mandatory 
installation of high-resolution CCTV systems 
in all licensed venues throughout Victoria to 
increase patron surveillance and allow for the 
rapid identification of both perpetrators and 
victims of violence (Department of Justice 
2009; VLRC 2010). However, evidence of the 
impact of CCTV in preventing, reducing or 
deterring crime remains equivocal (Wilson & 
Sutton 2003).
Digital identity authentication systems have 
similar appeal (Lyon 2009). ID scanning 
invokes ‘commonplace’ technology (Goold, 
Loader & Thumala 2010), such as a desktop 
or laptop computer, a digital camera, a 
portable scanning device and a hard drive, 
to automate conventional manual identity 
screening processes before a patron is 
granted entry into a venue. With appropriate 
software, these systems enable door staff 
to accurately identify and prevent entry to 
those with a previous record of violence at 
the venue.
At the point of entry into a licensed venue, 
a person must produce a driver’s licence or 
passport, or their fingerprint. An image of 
the document or biometric identifier is then 
scanned into a portable computer located at 
the venue or conveyed to a server operated 
by the system manufacturer. Most systems 
also require a digital photograph to be taken 
when a patron’s identity is first recorded and 
at each subsequent attempt to enter the 
venue. The technology then automatically 
matches the photograph with the person’s 
identification document or biometric 
fingerprint. System administrators can 
then manually adjust an individual’s digital 
record if they have engaged in any violent 
behaviour or are evicted from the premises. 
If a banned person attempts to re-enter 
the venue, automated matching of the 
compulsory photograph with the ‘flagged’ 
identity record enables door staff to readily 
identify those who should be denied entry.
Variants of this technology have been 
adopted to manage street offending in 
crime ‘hot spots’ (Beckett & Herbert 2008; 
Gibson 2003) and to facilitate penalties for 
the sale of alcohol to minors in the United 
States (Cross 2005). As with CCTV, the 
presence of an ID scanner might deter 
some patrons from attempting to enter a 
venue or engaging in violent and disorderly 
behaviour. Increasingly, data networking 
can also enable rapid digital information 
sharing between venue operators, security 
providers or police, which can assist in the 
enforcement of patron bans or prohibitions 
on underage entry into late-night venues.
There are currently few ID scanning systems 
available on the Australian market. This 
means it is easier for system developers 
to ‘share a banned list of troublemakers—
whether that listing is local, statewide or 
national’ (O’Brien & Duff 2011: 4) among 
all venues employing the same system. 
Therefore, ID scanners have enormous 
potential to address ongoing concerns 
about security and law enforcement 
arrangements in the night-time economy, 
given the seemingly pervasive risks of 
violence in Australian drinking culture 
(Tomsen 2005).
ID scanning in Geelong
In December 2006, a widely publicised 
rape in the Geelong central business 
district (CBD) served as a catalyst for the 
systematic review of safety arrangements 
in the local night-time economy (Palmer, 
Warren & Miller 2012). Persistent media 
reports advocated a ‘crackdown’ on law 
and order to reduce the frequency and 
brutality of alcohol-related violence. A 
voluntary Liquor Accord involving local 
police, liquor industry representatives, 
council officers and other interested parties 
became the primary vehicle for a series 
of reforms that was formally launched in 
November 2007. An independent review 
of the Accord in the early 1990s indicated 
this was a valuable forum for developing 
collaborative evidence-based strategies to 
reduce alcohol-related harm (Rumbold et 
al. 1998).
ID scanning was initially piloted in several 
venues throughout the Geelong CBD 
in May 2007. No evaluation of the pilot 
was conducted. When the revised Liquor 
Accord was formally launched, all venues 
with a license to trade after 1.00 am were 
automatically classified as ‘high-risk’ and 
were required to install an ID scanning 
system at the licensee’s expense. The 
Accord provided no additional information 
on the days or times this technology should 
be used. There were also no clear protocols 
dealing with information security or the 
sharing of data between CBD venues, 
police and other agencies.
Although the number of venues using 
ID scanners since November 2007 has 
fluctuated, 10 hotels in the CBD initially 
employed the technology, while one 
openly resisted its adoption. By the 
commencement of this study in mid-2009, 
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national media coverage widely praised 
the Geelong ID scanning initiative for its 
innovation and effectiveness in reducing 
alcohol-related violence (Palmer, Warren & 
Miller 2012). This research sought to test the 
accuracy of these claims.
Study design
A mixed method approach was adopted to 
examine the implementation and perceived 
effectiveness of ID scanners in the specific 
context of the Geelong night-time economy. 
Data were collected in three phases between 
March and November 2009.
Publicly available data
The study commenced with an extensive 
analysis of local, national and international 
media coverage, legal developments and 
government reports dealing with ID scanners. 
This material indicated ID scanning is an 
increasingly common method of screening 
patrons and preventing violence in various 
parts of Australia, the United Kingdom, 
the United States and Canada. However, 
it also revealed that few protocols have 
been developed to manage data obtained 
by venue proprietors or third-party system 
administrators (QLJSC 2010). Two major 
Canadian information privacy rulings had 
examined the use of ID scanning in highly 
localised settings (Palmer, Warren & Miller 
2011). Four states in the United States had 
express legal provisions allowing ID scanners 
to provide an ‘affirmative defence’ for any 
detected liquor control violations (Cross 
2005). Beyond this, there were few guidelines 
for administering this technology and no 
studies examining its effectiveness. This 
information helped to develop a standard 
question schedule for the second phase of 
the research.
Key stakeholders
Thirty-two key stakeholders involved in 
Liquor Accord discussions and the ensuing 
implementation in 2007 were interviewed 
between June and October 2009, with 
17 agreeing to a follow-up interview in 
early 2010. The initial sample included 17 
venue licensees who either implemented 
or resisted deploying ID scanners, four 
suppliers of this technology, three door and 
security staff, five members of the Accord 
who were not licensees, a representative 
from the Geelong ambulance service and 
the Australian Hotels Association, and a 
Canadian licensee who implemented an 
ID scanning system in 2005 after several 
liquor control citations involving underage 
patrons. All interviews ranged from 40 
to 120 minutes in length and were fully 
transcribed. This data was coded according 
to the perceived benefits, problems and 
effectiveness of ID scanning in reducing 
alcohol-related violence.
Site visits
A total of 324 short on-site interviews were 
conducted with patrons awaiting entry 
or already inside 10 major venues in the 
Geelong CBD. These surveys sought to 
document patron experiences with and 
perceptions of ID scanners in reducing 
violence and promoting greater safety in 
the night-time economy. Responses to 
standardised questions were entered into 
a Personal Data Assistant. All surveys were 
administered between 10.00 pm and 2.00 
am on Friday and Saturday nights from July 
2009. Most interviews were completed in 
less than 10 minutes and over 95 percent 
of patrons who were approached agreed to 
participate. Over two-thirds of respondents 
lived in the Geelong region, the mean year 
of birth was 1985 (SD=6) and 54.5 percent 
of respondents were male.
During this period, observations from 53 site 
visits were also conducted. Researchers 
operating in pairs visited three venues after 
10.00 pm on either a Friday or Saturday 
night. Observers recorded whether ID 
scanners were in use, any visible security 
arrangements and estimated intoxication 
rates using a four-point scale indicating no 
signs of intoxication, slight, medium and 
high. All observation data was entered into 
the Personal Data Assistant to promote 
accuracy and ease of analysis.
Official statistics
Police statistics documenting alcohol-related 
assaults in the Geelong Local Government 
Area (LGA) and emergency department 
admissions at Geelong Hospital between 
1 July 2004 and 30 June 2009 were also 
analysed. Although the precise location of 
assaults and involvement of alcohol are not 
reliably captured in the Victoria Police LEAP 
database, it was possible to use a proxy to 
estimate the number of assaults attributable 
to the night-time economy based on the 
time listed for each record. Those reported 
between 8.00 pm on Friday night and  
6.00 am on Sunday morning were classified 
as occurring during ‘high-risk’ periods of 
alcohol consumption (Dietze et al. 2001). 
Assaults reported between 8.00 pm and 
6.00 am Sunday to Thursday were given 
a ‘medium-risk’ classification and those 
between 6.00 am and 8.00 pm Monday to 
Sunday were considered to occur during 
‘low-risk’ periods. Assaults against police 
were excluded from this analysis.
Analysis
All documents and extended interview data 
were analysed to discern the motives for 
adopting or resisting the implementation of 
ID scanners and industry perspectives of 
their benefits and limitations in preventing 
or reducing alcohol-related violence. All 
data from site visits provided measures of 
public attitudes towards ID scanners and 
estimated intoxication rates during times 
when there is a ‘high risk’ of excessive 
alcohol consumption. Police and emergency 
department data offered measures of the 
impact of ID scanners in reducing reported 
incidents of alcohol-related violence and 
injury after the formal adoption of the ID 
scanning policy under the revised Liquor 
Accord from November 2007.
Results
Key stakeholder interviews
All but one venue licensee favoured the 
mandatory use of ID scanners and further 
data sharing across all ‘high-risk’ venues 
in the Geelong CBD. Suppliers of this 
technology, police, security personnel 
and local council officers endorsed 
these favourable views subject to minor 
qualifications.
Benefits of ID scanners
Respondents considered ID scanners to 
be the centrepiece of several measures 
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under the revised 2007 Accord that sought 
to proactively ‘do something’ to improve 
the management of the Geelong night-time 
economy and reduce both the frequency 
and brutality of violent confrontations. 
One licensee indicated most Accord 
participants initially viewed ID scanners as 
a contentious policy option. However, their 
effectiveness at ‘high-risk’ venues could 
be seen through discernible shifts in patron 
behaviour after their implementation.
I was apprehensive at first but since I 
implemented them over two years ago it’s 
probably been one of the biggest tools 
that I believe has changed the behaviour 
of the patrons in our venues (Licensee).
ID scanners were also considered to reduce 
antisocial behaviour in licensed venues by 
accurately identifying people with a recorded 
history of disorderly conduct and ensuring 
patron bans could be readily enforced. 
This served two important deterrence 
functions. First, licensees believed potential 
troublemakers avoided attempting to enter 
venues where scanners were deployed. 
Second, the increased probability of 
accurate and rapid identification was 
considered to attract more orderly patrons. 
Both venue licensees and suppliers 
considered ID scanners removed 
‘anonymity’ and reduced the likelihood 
that people with a propensity to engage in 
violence would attend the CBD nightclub 
precinct.
By removing anonymity, those who 
are prone to bad behaviour, and not 
necessarily just because of alcohol...but 
the fact that they know that they’re not 
anonymous, it’s pretty much a surety that 
they are going to be caught, be able to be 
identified and then caught, so they don’t 
do it. They’ll go elsewhere (Licensee).
Cost efficiency was significant, as ‘safety is 
business’ in the night-time economy. Both 
licensees and system suppliers indicated ID 
scanners are a low, one-off expense that is 
easy to install, maintain and upgrade. Most 
third-party system administrators provide 
low-cost technical support, software 
upgrades and data storage facilities. Thus, 
the technology is considered relatively easy 
to administer on-site and involves limited 
financial outlay.
Appearing to do something proactive 
about violence in the night-time economy, 
deterrence and cost efficiency were 
consistently viewed by venue licensees and 
other Accord participants as countering 
any perceived limitations of this technology. 
Commercial imperatives reinforced these 
themes among suppliers of ID scanning 
systems. Although one licensee expressed 
concern that police had placed undue 
pressure on ‘high-risk’ venue proprietors to 
implement the technology as a concession 
to the local liquor industry’s resistance 
to a proposed 2.00 am lockout at all 
venues, ID scanners were valued as a 
visible, deterrent-based and cost-effective 
measure designed to reduce violence. Only 
one licensee acknowledged that scanners 
might not deter drunken patrons engaged in 
‘spur of the moment’ confrontations, who 
are unlikely to consider or care about any 
potential ramifications from identity-based or 
CCTV surveillance.
Problems
When questioned further, it became clear 
that venue licensees, door staff and security 
personnel were also aware of several 
anomalies in the use of ID scanners that 
could impact on, but not override, their 
potential to reduce violence. During peak 
times when long queues can lead to patron 
antagonism, a policy of selective (non)
scanning was implemented at most larger 
venues. Patrons considered to be non-
threatening, such as young women, were 
generally ushered past the scanning unit 
without undergoing an identity check. Young 
men who conformed to an accepted risk 
profile were commonly entered into the 
system as a matter of course.
Door staff questioned the uneven 
application of selective non-scanning. In 
line with recent observations in Edmonton, 
Canada (Haggerty & Tokar 2012), one door 
worker indicated this ‘no hands on’ policy 
undermined the potential for ID scanners 
to reduce violence. Friends of door and 
security staff, preferred customers and 
venue members routinely bypassed the 
system with no electronic record of their 
presence (Haggerty & Ericson 2000). One 
respondent indicated it was difficult to 
challenge this practice.
[T]he bouncers do let in people that they 
know, like bikies, really rough people, and 
those kinds of people can make everyone 
else feel intimidated…But there [were] always 
fights. It seemed to always kind of be the 
same kind of people...Like they kind of just 
went there for fighting…I don’t think it [a 
scanner] really makes a difference…I think 
they are going to do it [fight] anyway because 
most of the time they are wasted so they are 
not going to think about ‘the scanners are 
there, I’m not going to do this’ (Door staff).
While a perceived  major benefit of ID 
scanning is its potential to remove patron 
anonymity, selective non-scanning 
undermines this in two ways. As the above 
quote indicates, it can enable security 
staff to allow patrons willing to engage in 
violence to enter licensed venues (Haggerty 
& Tokar 2012). However, by informally 
profiling young men deemed to be potential 
‘troublemakers’, a considerable proportion 
of potential victims of violence might 
remain difficult to identify if their personal 
details are not entered into these systems 
(Harcourt 2007). This second issue was 
not recognised by any key stakeholders 
interviewed for this study.
All venues are required to display ‘clear 
signage at the front of the premise 
explaining that the patrons details were kept 
for 28 days and then destroyed’ (Licensee). 
However, door staff indicated there were few 
protocols for describing the ID scanning 
policy to concerned patrons. While this 
was rarely necessary, door staff commonly 
advised ‘the law’ mandated ID scanners. 
Concerned patrons could try entering 
another venue or were advised to contact 
system administrators during business 
hours. Concerns were seldom raised about 
whether this advice undermined a patron’s 
voluntary consent to having their personal 
information shared and stored at the venue.
Data retention policies are also adapted 
from principles developed for CCTV, 
requiring personal information to be 
deleted after 30 days. Suppliers indicated 
various operating procedures and technical 
protocols were developed in line with 
both state and federal privacy laws. One 
biometric system incorporated a complex 
data encryption system that could only be 
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accessed by third-party administrators and 
was developed through the use of privacy 
consultants to ensure compliance with 
the national privacy principles. However, 
this system has yet to be incorporated in 
Geelong.
One ID system supplier questioned 
the lack of clear regulatory standards 
regarding the collection and dissemination 
of personal data. As demand increases 
for interoperable technology and greater 
information sharing about banned patrons 
among venue managers, police and 
security agencies, there is a need for the 
development of clear regulatory and data 
management protocols. Nevertheless, 
the following quote also highlights that 
increased regulation may prioritise 
information privacy over patron safety.
The fact that there are no protocols…
leaves the use of these things vulnerable. 
They have been highly effective and the 
misuse of one could bring down a lot of 
good work and that worries me quite a 
bit. So in terms of is regulation needed 
for it? Yes. But the problem is when you 
get regulators involved…they are largely 
coming from an angle that is myopic 
and not a balance of what the real 
objective is; and that is making it safe. 
And making it safe means there has to 
be some surrendering of privacy (System 
Manufacturer).
Licensees favoured the open 
circulation of information between 
all Geelong venues and with police 
to prevent ‘bar hopping’ by flagged 
or banned individuals. As one venue 
licensee described:
If you can get it [ID scanning] 
implemented on a grand scale in the 
CBD at least it has some sort of impact 
because if they were to be banned from 
[one venue]…[unruly patrons] used to 
be able to walk into any other venue 
they can. But now it impacts on all the 
CBD venues so if they’re banned they’re 
banned everywhere…(Licensee).
However, this study revealed an important 
paradox associated with information privacy 
and crime prevention. Victoria Police 
consistently used information privacy as 
the standard justification for only providing 
generalised LGA data rather than the 
specific locations of reported assaults 
or basic demographic characteristics of 
victims and suspects. Local government 
representatives participating in the 
development of the November 2007 Accord 
considered this was the major impediment 
to the development of meaningful evidence-
based policies to combat alcohol-related 
violence.
Patron surveys and site 
observations
Patrons were asked about their previous 
experiences with ID scanners, whether 
they had been scanned before entering 
any Geelong venue in the previous 12 
hours and to rate their satisfaction with 
this requirement. Just over 50 percent of 
respondents (n=169 of 324) had been in 
one or more licensed venues within 12 
hours of being surveyed, with 68.6 percent 
indicating their ID had been checked and 
nearly half (47.3%) confirming their details 
were electronically scanned. Around the 
same proportion of males (68.5%) and 
females (68.8%) indicated their ID was 
checked on the night of the interview. The 
mean satisfaction score for ID scanners 
across the entire sample was eight out of 10.
At least five site visits were conducted at 10 
venues in the Geelong CBD. In 58 percent 
of these sessions (29 visits), all patron ID 
documents were scanned electronically 
before entry. In one-quarter of cases, no 
ID was checked at any point. Observers 
reported their own ID was not checked in 
14 percent of site visits. Perceived patron 
intoxication levels were considerably higher 
in venues with ID scanners. However, this 
is to be expected as all venues with ID 
scanners are automatically classified as 
‘high-risk’ and trade after 1.00 am.
Police and emergency 
department data
Police data indicate that 5,064 assaults 
were recorded between 2004–05 and 
2008–09 in the Geelong LGA. Overall, this 
represents an upward trend over time, 
though with significant fluctuation (see 
Figure 1). However, the number of reported 
offenders and victims increased after ID 
scanners were mandated under the revised 
Liquor Accord. Figure 1 outlines average 
monthly assault data for the ‘high-risk’ 
Figure 1 Mean monthly street assaults, April 2005–August 2009 (n)
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alcohol consumption period between  
8.00 pm on Friday night and 6.00 am on 
Sunday morning before and after ID scanners 
were introduced. While the overall rates are 
relatively low, a slight increase is discernible 
after the revised Accord was launched.
Table 1 documents the aggregate rates 
of offenders and victims identified in the 
Geelong LGA. These figures also indicate 
ID scanners had no immediate impact in 
reducing assaults reported by or to local 
police from mid-2007 to mid-2009.
Figure 2 documents trends in reported 
assaults during ‘high-risk’ alcohol 
consumption times between July 2004 
and May 2009 based on location. Monthly 
trend data identify fluctuating assault rates 
in the street, private homes and on licensed 
premises. When this data is depicted at 
quarterly intervals, there is a reduction in 
the number of assaults in licensed premises 
from July 2008. By this time, ID scanners 
were an accepted facet of Geelong’s night-
time economy.
Emergency department data reinforce 
these trends, even though changes in the 
reporting of alcohol-related triage incidents 
were introduced between 2005 and 2009 
[2]. Time series analysis indicates around 
25 percent of alcohol-related emergency 
department admissions during ‘high-risk’ 
periods occurred between 11.00 pm and 
1.00 am, with a sharp increase exceeding 
100 percent between May and December 
2007 (Miller et al. 2011; Palmer, Warren 
& Miller 2011). These rates subsequently 
plateaued, then fluctuated, to produce an 
aggregate increase in alcohol-related assault 
and emergency department admissions 
since 2005.
Discussion
Despite claims by venue licensees and 
system suppliers, this study provides limited 
empirical support for claims alcohol-related 
assaults in and around Geelong’s late-night 
venues have declined since the initial pilot 
of May 2007 and the subsequent mandated 
use of ID scanners under the revised Liquor 
Accord. Between May 2007 and May 
2008, there was no discernible reduction 
in either reported assaults (see Figure 2) 
or emergency department admissions 
that identify alcohol-consumption as a key 
variable. Increases in street assaults from 
July 2008 suggest ID scanners may have 
produced a displacement effect, but firm 
conclusions on this point are not possible. 
This is an example of one of Brown’s 
(2013) key principles of regulation of crime 
prevention interventions—they must be 
effective at preventing crime.
A different picture emerges when these 
figures are considered in light of key 
stakeholder interview data. Venue licensees 
and system managers equate improved 
business with the erosion of anonymity 
and deterrence. However, selective non-
scanning has significant potential to 
undermine these key benefits. Door staff 
indicated this form of profiling had not 
reduced violence at some Geelong venues. 
Figure 2 Monthly assault frequency by location during ‘high-risk’ periods, July 2004–May 2009 (n)
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Table 1 Offenders and victims by year, Geelong LGA, 2004–2009
2004/05 2005/06 2006/07 2007/08 2008/09
Offenders 587 782 808 924 953
Victims 758 929 947 1080 1103
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More problematically, the inability to rapidly 
identify a significant proportion of potential 
crime victims is a recognised by-product of 
selective profiling (Harcourt 2007). Selectively 
targeting potentially ‘troublesome’ young 
men allows certain individuals or groups 
to remain anonymous and potentially less 
readily identified if a victim or offender. This 
generates a rather skewed ‘surveillant 
assemblage’ (Haggerty & Ericson 2000: 619) 
that is difficult for those who are proactively 
targeted to contest.
However, ID scanners have considerable 
value in enforcing bans from licensed 
venues. By nature, banning policies 
can only be enforced through identity 
authentication (Beckett & Herbert 2010; 
Lyon 2009). System suppliers, venue 
licensees and security staff unanimously 
agreed that the use of ID scanners is an 
efficient method for excluding banned 
patrons. Most Australian states have 
legislatively mandated short-term public 
order bans and long-term prohibitions 
on entering licensed venues or nightclub 
precincts for serious alcohol-related 
offences that operate alongside a licensee’s 
proprietary right to deny entry or evict any 
patron (see Palmer & Warren 2013). The 
information about patrons that have been 
banned by venues or have been subject 
to legislated banning orders is shared 
between police and venues via the local 
Liquor Accords, thus avoiding breaches of 
privacy regulations.
However, the lack of clear policy guidance 
on implementing ID scanning technology 
enables door staff and security personnel 
to subvert the intent of removing patron 
anonymity, which can occur at the expense 
of ‘the actual task of providing [human] 
protection’ (Zedner 2006: 277). In Harcourt’s 
(2007: 23–25) terms, this is a form of 
‘elasticity’. Selective profiling that aims to 
enforce venue exclusions legitimises gaps in 
the administration of ID scanning that either 
allow other forms of crime to remain immune 
from the surveillant assemblage, or that 
potentially compromises the identification 
of victims of violence with no recorded 
electronic profile. This helps to explain why 
there has been no significant decline in 
reported assaults or emergency department 
admissions between November 2007 and 
mid-2009.
Crime prevention technologies present 
numerous challenges for privacy regulators 
in Australia (ALRC 2008) and internationally 
(Brogan 2002/2003; Goold & Neyland 
2009). Considerable patron satisfaction 
with ID scanners in Geelong reflects public 
‘apathy about having one’s driver’s license 
scanned’ (Holloman & Ponder 2007: 45) as 
identified in US literature. This also reveals 
immense trust that any personal data that 
is collected is unlikely to be ‘used outside 
of the scope of ensuring a safe and legal 
atmosphere within the establishments’ 
(Holloman & Ponder 2007: 45).
By contrast, privacy is a significant barrier 
to the dissemination of valuable information 
about trends in alcohol-related assault that 
reinforces the legitimacy of ID scanners as 
a crime prevention measure. The availability 
of data indicating where victims and 
perpetrators of assault had last consumed 
alcohol in the New South Wales city of 
Newcastle was considered vital to the 
development of targeted evidence-based 
interventions leading to a 30 percent 
reduction in alcohol-related assaults 
(Wiggers 2007; Wiggers et al. 2004). 
Such data could have additional value in 
measuring the displacement effects of any 
ID scanning or other forms of surveillance 
introduced into the night-time economy.
Finally, the uncritical acceptance of ID 
scanners in Geelong is a symptom of 
broader trends in the ‘governance of 
security’ through established industry 
networks (Johnston & Shearing 2003: 
26; Wood & Dupont 2006). In Geelong, 
a security representative proposed the 
introduction of ID scanners to members of 
the Liquor Accord that included delegates 
from the local nightclub association, 
the safety committee, police and local 
government employees. The Geelong 
media also played a central public relations 
function that consistently endorsed the ID 
scanners policy (Palmer, Warren & Miller 
2012). Industry resistance to a proposed 
venue lockout favoured by police ensured 
ID scanners would be a tangible regulatory 
‘bargaining tool’ with significant commercial 
appeal. These political processes are crucial 
in understanding the popular acceptance 
and subsequent normalisation of ID scanners 
in the Geelong night-time economy and 
extend to other regional and urban centres 
contemplating the introduction of this and 
other surveillance technologies to combat 
alcohol-related violence.
Conclusion and policy 
considerations
The introduction, acceptance and 
normalisation of ID scanners in Geelong 
bear remarkable similarities to the 
permeation of open space CCTV systems 
in Australia since the mid-1990s (Wilson 
& Sutton 2003). As with various security 
technologies, the use of digital ID 
authentication systems to prevent crime 
is poised to expand. This technology 
generates extensive data ‘assemblages’ 
about patron movements to facilitate the 
enforcement of bans and other forms of 
spatial exclusion, with data about ‘flagged’ 
persons matched to digital photographs, 
biometric identifiers, names, addresses 
and driver’s license numbers. Largely 
administered by commercial security 
agents, these systems can be easily 
networked across towns, cities, regions, 
states and internationally.
However, the frequent demand for 
immediate and tangible solutions to 
crime problems tends to overlook 
significant harms that may stem from new 
technological innovations. The widespread 
uptake of surveillance technologies and 
the substantial data sharing potential they 
offer in preventing crime, enhancing law 
enforcement efficiency and promoting 
security, also produces a clear need for 
independent and ongoing evidence-based 
research to inform the effective and safe use 
of such technologies (VLRC 2010). As data 
from ID scanners can potentially transcend 
state borders, it is suggested that a national 
working group be established to examine 
the regulatory options for this and other 
forms of population surveillance designed to 
prevent crime, as has been long recognised 
in relation to CCTV (Wilson & Sutton 2003). 
Key issues to be considered include:
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•	A temporary moratorium on the use of ID 
scanners pending the development of an 
appropriate regulatory framework for data 
collection, storage, dissemination and 
privacy protection.
•	The expansion of private security 
licensing to cover all personnel involved 
in using ID scanners, including the 
development of appropriate training and 
accountability measures.
•	Specific policies and accountability 
processes for information sharing between 
private venue operators, security providers, 
police and criminal intelligence agencies.
•	The provision of alternatives to ID 
scanning where patrons are unwilling to 
consent to the collection and storage of 
their personal information.
•	 The development of an independent and 
transparent complaints mechanism.
•	The revision of current public order, 
summary offences, criminal, liquor 
licensing, administrative appeals and 
privacy regimes to develop an appropriate 
audit and compliance procedure.
•	 The promotion of ongoing local, state, 
national and international research into ID 
scanners, related electronic surveillance 
measures and their impact in preventing 
crime and alcohol-related harm.
Concepts of effectiveness based on 
deterrence, reduced anonymity and profiling 
have normalised digital ID verification as 
a legitimate form of social sorting. This 
study demonstrates that ID scanners 
are a tangible policy supported by what 
are currently poorly validated claims of 
‘success’. The rapid introduction of these 
new technologies aimed at producing fast 
and discernible results has occurred with 
little consideration for the development 
of appropriate protocols regarding 
the collection, use, sharing, storage, 
maintenance, access to and destruction 
of digital information. Further, there has 
been limited oversight of how private venue 
operators or third-party security providers 
manage these databases independently of, 
and in conjunction with, the police.
These concerns have been overlooked 
because the commercial appeal of these 
relatively inexpensive technologies is 
central to their acceptance as prevention 
measures within the night-time economy. 
Equivalent concerns over information 
privacy have invariably been outweighed by 
public anxieties about crime and violence. 
While this research indicates that such 
concerns have only been recognised 
by a minority of stakeholders involved 
in the formulation and implementation 
of the Geelong ID scanners policy, they 
demonstrate the need for ongoing research 
and a coherent policy direction.
Notes
1. A trial commenced in May 2007 with 
further ad hoc additions to the use of ID 
scanners up to October 2007, which pre-
empted the formal launch of the revised 
Liquor Accord in November 2007. This 
paper adopts November as the significant 
starting point.
2. This study commenced before, 
though overlapped with, a second larger 
comparative study examining various 
alcohol-related interventions, including ID 
scanners, in the regional cities of Geelong 
and Newcastle.
Acknowledgements
This paper is taken from the report of 
research undertaken with the assistance 
of grant 42/08–09 from the Criminology 
Research Council. The authors thank 
Emma McFarlane and Anders Sønderlund 
for assisting with this research.
References
All URLs correct at October 2013
Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) 2008. 
For your information: Australian privacy law and 
practice. Vols 1–3. Canberra: ALRC
Beckett K & Herbert S 2010. Banished: The new 
social control in urban America. New York: Oxford 
University Press
Beckett K & Herbert S 2008. Dealing with disorder: 
Social control in the post-industrial city. Theoretical 
Criminology 12(1): 5–30
Brogan JJ 2002/2003. ‘Facing the music’: The 
dubious constitutionality of facial recognition 
technology. Hastings Communications and 
Entertainment Law Journal 25(1): 65–96
Brown R 2013. Regulating crime prevention 
design into consumer products: Learning the 
lessons from electronic vehicle immobilisation. 
Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal Justice no. 
453. Canberra: Australian Institute of Criminology. 
http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/current%20
series/tandi/441-460/tandi453.html
Cross JT 2005. Age verification in the 21st 
century: Swiping away your privacy. The John 
Marshall Journal of Computer & Information Law 
23(2): 363–410
Department of Justice (Victoria) 2009. Liquor 
control reform regulations: Regulatory impact 
statement. Melbourne: Department of Justice. 
http://www.allenconsult.com.au/publications.
php?s=liquor-control-reform-regulations-
regulatory-impact-statement
Dietze PM et al. 2001. The Victorian alcohol 
statistics handbook vol. 2: Alcohol-related 
serious road injury and assault in Victoria, 
1992–1999. Melbourne: Turning Point Alcohol & 
Drug Centre Inc
Gibson T 2003. Securing the spectacular city: 
The politics of revitalization and homelessness 
in downtown Seattle. New York: Rowman & 
Littlefield Publishers
Goold B & Neyland D 2009 (eds). New directions 
on surveillance and privacy. Cullompton: Willan 
Publishing
Goold B, Loader I & Thumala A 2010. Consuming 
security? Theoretical Criminology 14(1): 3–30
Graham K & Homel R 2008. Raising the bar: 
Preventing aggression in and around bars, clubs 
and pubs. Cullompton: Willan Publishing
Hadfield P 2006. Bar wars: Contesting the night 
in contemporary British cities. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press
Hadfield P, Lister S & Traynor P 2009. ‘This town’s 
a different town today’: Policing and regulating 
the night-time economy. Criminology & Criminal 
Justice 9(4): 465–485
Haggerty KD & Ericson R 2000. The surveillant 
assemblage. British Journal of Sociology 51(4): 
605–622
Haggerty KD & Tokar C 2012. Signifying security: 
On the institutional appeals of nightclub ID 
scanning systems. Space & Culture 15(2): 
124–134
Harcourt BE 2007. Against prediction: Profiling, 
policing, and punishing in an actuarial age. 
Chicago: University of Chicago Press
Holloman KR & Ponder DE 2007. Clubs, bars, 
and the driver’s license scanning system, in 
Larsen KR & Voronovich ZA (eds) Privacy in a 
transparent world. Boulder: Ethica Publishing: 
40–47. http://www.ethicapublishing.com/7CH5.
htm
Homel R, Hauritz M, Wortley R, McIlwain G & 
Carvolth R 1997. Preventing alcohol-related crime 
through community action: The Surfers Paradise 
safety action project, in Homel R (ed.), Policing for 
prevention: Reducing crime, public intoxication 
and injury. Crime Prevention Studies vol 7. New 
York: Criminal Justice Press: 35–90
Johnston L & Shearing C 2003. Governing 
security: Explorations in policing and justice. 
New York: Routledge
Lyon D 2009. Identifying citizens: ID cards as 
surveillance. Cambridge: Polity Press
www.aic.gov.au
General editor, Trends & issues  
in crime and criminal justice series:  
Dr Adam M Tomison, Director,  
Australian Institute of Criminology
Note: Trends & issues in crime and 
criminal justice papers are peer reviewed
For a complete list and the full text of the 
papers in the Trends & issues in crime and 
criminal justice series, visit the AIC website 
at: http://www.aic.gov.au
ISSN  0817-8542  (Print) 
1836-2206  (Online)
© Australian Institute of Criminology 2013
GPO Box 2944  
Canberra ACT 2601, Australia 
Tel: 02 6260 9200 
Fax: 02 6260 9299
Disclaimer: This research paper does  
not necessarily reflect the policy position  
of the Australian Government
Miller P et al. 2011. Do community interventions 
targeting licensed venues reduce alcohol-related 
emergency department presentations? Drug & 
Alcohol Review 30(5): 546–553
O’Brien N & Duff E 2011. To drink here, first 
queue to give fingerprints—Privacy experts fear 
pub scanning is out of control. Sun Herald 30 
January 2012: 4
Palmer D & Warren I 2013. Zonal banning and 
public order in urban Australia, in Lippert R & 
Walby K (eds), Policing cities: Urban securitization 
and regulation in a 21st century world. London: 
Routledge/Taylor & Francis: 79–96
Palmer D, Warren I & Miller P 2012. ID scanning, 
the media and the politics of urban surveillance in 
an Australian regional city. Surveillance & Society 
9(3): 293–309. http://library.queensu.ca/ojs/
index.php/surveillance-and-society/article/view/
aussie_regional
Palmer D, Warren I & Miller P 2011. ID scanners 
in the night-time economy: Social sorting or 
social order. Canberra: Report to the Criminology 
Research Council. Grant 42/08–09
Queensland Law, Justice & Safety Committee 
(QLJSC) 2010. Inquiry into alcohol-related 
violence: Final report no. 74. Brisbane: Legislative 
Assembly of Queensland. http://www.parliament.
qld.gov.au/documents/committees/LJSC/2009/
alcohol-related-violence/Report74.pdf
Rumbold G, Malpass A, Lang E, Cvetkovski S 
& Kelly W 1998. Evaluation of the Geelong local 
industry accord. Final report. Melbourne: Turning 
Point Alcohol & Drug Centre Inc
Tomsen S 2005. ‘Boozers and bouncers’: 
Masculine conflict, disengagement and the 
contemporary governance of drinking-related 
violence and disorder. The Australian and New 
Zealand Journal of Criminology 38(3): 283–297
Victorian Law Reform Commission (VLRC) 2010. 
Surveillance in public places: Final Report, no. 18. 
Melbourne: VLRC
Victoria Police 2012a. Offences recorded by 
offence code. Melbourne: Victoria Police. http://
www.police.vic.gov.au/content.asp?a=internetBri
dgingPage&Media_ID=72209
Victoria Police 2012b. Crime statistics 2011/2012. 
Melbourne: Victoria Police. http://www.police.vic.
gov.au/content.asp?Document_ID=782
Victoria Police 2010. Annual report 2009–10. 
Melbourne: Victoria Police. http://www.police.vic.
gov.au/content.asp?a=internetBridgingPage&Me
dia_ID=73868
Wiggers J et al. 2004. Strategies and outcomes 
in translating alcohol harm reduction research 
into practice: The alcohol linking program. Drug & 
Alcohol Review 23(3): 355–364
Wiggers JH 2007. Reducing alcohol-related 
violence and improving community safety: The 
alcohol linking program. NSW Public Health 
Bulletin 18(6): 83–85
Wilson D & Sutton A 2003. Open-street CCTV in 
Australia. Trends & Issues in Crime and Criminal 
Justice no. 272. Canberra: Australian Institute of 
Criminology. http://www.aic.gov.au/publications/
current%20series/tandi/261-280/tandi271.html
Winlow S & Hall S 2006. Violent night: Urban 
leisure and contemporary culture. Oxford: Berg
Wood J & Dupont B (eds) 2006. Democracy, 
society and the governance of security. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
Zajdow G 2011. Outsourcing the risks: Alcohol 
licensing, risk and the making of the night-time 
economy. Current Issues in Criminal Justice 23(1): 
73–84
Zedner L 2006. Liquid security: Managing 
the market for crime control. Criminology and 
Criminal Justice 6(3): 267–288
Dr Darren Palmer is an Associate 
Professor in Criminology at Deakin 
University and member of Deakin’s 
Centre for Citizenship and Globalisation.
Dr Ian Warren is a Senior Lecturer 
in Criminology at Deakin University 
and member of Deakin’s Centre for 
Citizenship and Globalisation.
Peter Miller is an Associate Professor 
and Principal Research Fellow in 
Psychology at Deakin University.
